Fix shell injection vulnerability in GitHub Actions workflow [SEC-1714]#1456
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spencerdrak merged 1 commit intodevelopfrom Mar 24, 2026
Merged
Fix shell injection vulnerability in GitHub Actions workflow [SEC-1714]#1456spencerdrak merged 1 commit intodevelopfrom
spencerdrak merged 1 commit intodevelopfrom
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Fix potential shell injection vulnerability in the semgrep-ci-e2e workflow by using an environment variable instead of direct interpolation.
## Changes
- Modified the Debug step to use an `env:` block for the `docker_tag` output
- Changed the `run:` script to reference the quoted environment variable `"$DOCKER_TAG"` instead of using direct `${{ }}` interpolation
## Why
Direct interpolation of `${{ steps.get-inputs.outputs.docker_tag }}` in the `run:` script is vulnerable to command injection. If the `docker_tag` value contains shell metacharacters or malicious commands, they would be executed by the runner. By storing the value in an environment variable first and referencing it with double quotes, the value is treated as a literal string rather than being interpreted by the shell.
## Semgrep Finding Details
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
@leif@semgrep.com requested Semgrep Assistant generate this pull request to fix [a finding](https://semgrep.dev/orgs/semgrep/findings/679965828) from the detection rule [yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection](https://semgrep.dev/r/yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection).
leifdreizler
changed the title
spencerdrak
approved these changes
Mar 24, 2026
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Fix potential shell injection vulnerability in the semgrep-ci-e2e workflow by using an environment variable instead of direct interpolation.
Changes
env:block for thedocker_tagoutputrun:script to reference the quoted environment variable"$DOCKER_TAG"instead of using direct${{ }}interpolationWhy
Direct interpolation of
${{ steps.get-inputs.outputs.docker_tag }}in therun:script is vulnerable to command injection. If thedocker_tagvalue contains shell metacharacters or malicious commands, they would be executed by the runner. By storing the value in an environment variable first and referencing it with double quotes, the value is treated as a literal string rather than being interpreted by the shell.Semgrep Finding Details
Using variable interpolation
${{...}}withgithubcontext data in arun:step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code.githubcontext data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable withenv:to store the data and use the environment variable in therun:script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".@leif@semgrep.com requested Semgrep Assistant generate this pull request to fix a finding from the detection rule yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection.