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## Why [#12964](#12964) added `host_executable()` support to `codex-execpolicy`, but the zsh-fork interception path in `unix_escalation.rs` was still evaluating commands with the default exact-token matcher. That meant an intercepted absolute executable such as `/usr/bin/git status` could still miss basename rules like `prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "status"])`, even when the policy also defined a matching `host_executable(name = "git", ...)` entry. This PR adopts the new matching behavior in the zsh-fork runtime only. That keeps the rollout intentionally narrow: zsh-fork already requires explicit user opt-in, so it is a safer first caller to exercise the new `host_executable()` scheme before expanding it to other execpolicy call sites. It also brings zsh-fork back in line with the current `prefix_rule()` execution model. Until prefix rules can carry their own permission profiles, a matched `prefix_rule()` is expected to rerun the intercepted command unsandboxed on `allow`, or after the user accepts `prompt`, instead of merely continuing inside the inherited shell sandbox. ## What Changed - added `evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy()` in `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` to centralize execpolicy evaluation for intercepted commands - switched intercepted direct execs in the zsh-fork path to `check_multiple_with_options(...)` with `MatchOptions { resolve_host_executables: true }` - added `commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy()` so zsh-fork policy evaluation works from intercepted `(program, argv)` data instead of reconstructing a synthetic command before matching - left shell-wrapper parsing intentionally disabled by default behind `ENABLE_INTERCEPTED_EXEC_POLICY_SHELL_WRAPPER_PARSING`, so path-sensitive matching relies on later direct exec interception rather than shell-script parsing - made matched `prefix_rule()` decisions rerun intercepted commands with `EscalationExecution::Unsandboxed`, while unmatched-command fallback keeps the existing sandbox-preserving behavior - extracted the zsh-fork test harness into `core/tests/common/zsh_fork.rs` so both the skill-focused and approval-focused integration suites can exercise the same runtime setup - limited this change to the intercepted zsh-fork path rather than changing every execpolicy caller at once - added runtime coverage in `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs` for allowed and disallowed `host_executable()` mappings and the wrapper-parsing modes - added integration coverage in `core/tests/suite/approvals.rs` to verify a saved `prefix_rule(pattern=["touch"], decision="allow")` reruns under zsh-fork outside a restrictive `WorkspaceWrite` sandbox --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13046). * #13065 * __->__ #13046
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Why
#12964 added
host_executable()support tocodex-execpolicy, and #13046 adopted it in the zsh-fork interception path.The remaining gap was the preflight execpolicy check in
core/src/exec_policy.rs. That path derives approval requirements before execution forshell,shell_command, andunified_exec, but it was still using the default exact-token matcher.As a result, a command that already included an absolute executable path, such as
/usr/bin/git status, could still miss a basename rule likeprefix_rule(pattern = ["git"], ...)during preflight even when the policy also defined a matchinghost_executable(name = "git", ...)entry.This PR brings the same opt-in
host_executable()resolution to the preflight approval path when an absolute program path is already present in the parsed command.What Changed
ExecPolicyManager::create_exec_approval_requirement_for_command()incore/src/exec_policy.rsto usecheck_multiple_with_options(...)withMatchOptions { resolve_host_executables: true }host_executable()permits itprefix_rule()amendments are checked consistently for absolute-path commandshost_executable()host_executable()mappingVerification
just fix -p codex-corecargo test -p codex-core --lib exec_policy::tests::