HSEC-2025-0005: cabal-install dependency confusion

advisories/hackage/cabal-install/HSEC-2025-0005.md

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+```toml
+[advisory]
+id = "HSEC-2025-0005"
+cwe = [427]
+keywords = ["hackage", "supply-chain", "historical"]
+
+[[affected]]
+package = "cabal-install"
+cvss = "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
+[[affected.versions]]
+fixed = "3.4.0.0"
+introduced = "1.0.0.0"
+
+[[references]]
+type = "REPORT"
+url = "https://frasertweedale.github.io/blog-fp/posts/2021-02-12-haskell-dependency-confusion.html"
+```
+
+# `cabal-install` dependency confusion
+
+For **cabal-install < 3.4.0.0** and where multiple repositories are
+configured, the resolver picks the highest available version across
+all repositories.  Where a package is only defined in a private
+repository, this behaviour leads to a [*dependency confusion*][blog]
+supply chain vulnerability.  If the private package name becomes
+known, a malicious actor can claim the name in the public repository
+and publish a malicious version at a higher version number.
+
+Default `cabal-install` configurations that only use the
+`hackage.haskell.org` repository are not affected.  Configurations
+that use curated private repositories **exclusively** are also not
+affected.
+
+[blog]: https://frasertweedale.github.io/blog-fp/posts/2021-02-12-haskell-dependency-confusion.html
+
+
+## Mitigations
+
+*cabal-install* version **3.4.0.0** and higher provide an `override`
+option in the repository configuration.  It marks the associated
+repository as canonical for all packages defined in that repository.
+No other repositories will be considered.  For example:
+
+```
+-- For packages in repo.example.com,
+-- only versions in repo.example.com are considered
+active-repositories:
+  , hackage.haskell.org
+  , repo.example.com:override
+```
+
+Users and organisations using private repositories that contain
+private packages in addition to public repositories **MUST** use the
+`override` option to prevent dependency confusion attacks.
+
+Alternatively, projects and organisations can run a private instance
+of *hackage-server* and carefully curate and review its contents.
+Using that instance exclusively defeats supply chain attacks
+including *dependency confusion*.  For *cabal-install < 3.4* and
+where using multiple repositories, this is the only effective
+mitigation against dependency confusion attacks.