fix: validate $ARGUMENTS path before shell interpolation in optimize command#197
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xiaolai wants to merge 1 commit intoccplugins:mainfrom
Open
fix: validate $ARGUMENTS path before shell interpolation in optimize command#197xiaolai wants to merge 1 commit intoccplugins:mainfrom
xiaolai wants to merge 1 commit intoccplugins:mainfrom
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…command The pre-context shell commands `du -h $ARGUMENTS` and `wc -l $ARGUMENTS` interpolated raw user input directly into shell, enabling injection via the !` execution mechanism (e.g. a value like `"; rm -rf ~"`). Add a `[[ "$ARGUMENTS" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9_./-]+$ ]]` guard before each command and quote the variable, so only safe file path characters are accepted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security Bug (Medium)
plugins/optimize/commands/optimize.mdlines 6–7 use the!(pre-context shell execution) mechanism to gather file metadata:$ARGUMENTSis interpolated unquoted and unvalidated directly into shell commands. A user passing a crafted value such as"; rm -rf ~"or$(malicious-command)would have it executed during context-building — before Claude is even invoked.Note: the
allowed-tools: Bash(du:*), Bash(wc:*)restriction applies to the Bash tool used during Claude's turn, not to the!pre-context execution which happens at prompt-build time. The injection surface is the!backtick mechanism.Fix
Add a
[[ "$ARGUMENTS" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9_./-]+$ ]]guard before each command and quote the variable:This allows safe file paths (letters, digits,
_,.,/,-) and rejects anything with shell metacharacters. The behavior for legitimate file path arguments is unchanged.