feat(server+migrate): round-1 feedback followups

examples/mcp_with_auth_middleware.py

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 :func:`~adcp.server.auth_context_factory` onto a multi-tenant sales
 agent. The SDK owns the security-critical plumbing (constant-time
 token compare, discovery bypass, ``ContextVar`` reset-in-finally);
-the seller supplies only ``validate_token`` and the handler logic.
+the seller supplies only the token → principal map and the handler
+logic.
 
 Run::
 
@@ -14,12 +15,14 @@
 
 Production note: ``mcp.run()`` is used here for brevity. Real
 deployments should mount the Starlette app behind uvicorn + a reverse
-proxy that terminates TLS and handles rate limiting.
+proxy that terminates TLS and handles rate limiting. Production
+agents also typically load tokens from a database — swap
+``validator_from_token_map`` for an ``async def validate_token`` that
+hits your token store.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import hashlib
 from typing import Any
 
 from adcp.server import (
@@ -28,37 +31,23 @@
     Principal,
     ToolContext,
     auth_context_factory,
-    constant_time_token_match,
     create_mcp_server,
+    validator_from_token_map,
 )
 from adcp.server.responses import capabilities_response, products_response
 
 # Real agents look tokens up in Postgres / Vault / an identity provider.
-# Keyed by SHA-256 so the comparison uses ``hmac.compare_digest`` rather
-# than raw string equality — never compare raw bearer tokens with ``==``.
-_TOKEN_HASHES: dict[str, Principal] = {
-    hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest(): principal
-    for raw, principal in {
-        "token-acme": Principal(
-            caller_identity="principal-acme-ops",
-            tenant_id="tenant-acme",
-        ),
+# ``validator_from_token_map`` hashes the raw tokens at construction and
+# does ``hmac.compare_digest`` lookups — same security properties as a
+# hand-rolled validator, one line instead of a dozen.
+validate_token = validator_from_token_map(
+    {
+        "token-acme": Principal(caller_identity="principal-acme-ops", tenant_id="tenant-acme"),
         "token-globex": Principal(
-            caller_identity="principal-globex-ops",
-            tenant_id="tenant-globex",
+            caller_identity="principal-globex-ops", tenant_id="tenant-globex"
         ),
-    }.items()
-}
-
-
-def validate_token(token: str) -> Principal | None:
-    """Seller-supplied token validator.
-
-    ``constant_time_token_match`` iterates every stored hash with
-    :func:`hmac.compare_digest`, avoiding the prefix-match timing leak
-    that a plain ``dict`` lookup would have.
-    """
-    return constant_time_token_match(token, _TOKEN_HASHES)
+    }
+)
 
 
 class MultiTenantSalesAgent(ADCPHandler):

src/adcp/migrate/v3_to_v4.py

@@ -396,9 +396,44 @@ def _format_text_report(report: Report, *, apply_changes: bool) -> str:
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 
+REPORT_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+"""Version of the JSON report shape. CI scripts / editors parsing the
+migrate output key on this so a future shape change (adding a summary
+block, renaming fields) doesn't silently break them.
+
+Bump the minor SDK version AND this constant when changing the JSON
+shape in a non-additive way. Additive changes (new optional keys)
+stay at the same version.
+
+**v1 shape:**
+
+.. code-block:: json
+
+    {
+      "schema_version": 1,
+      "scanned_files": int,
+      "rewritten_files": int,
+      "applied": [
+        {"kind": "rename", "path": str, "line": int, "column": int,
+         "before": str, "after": str, "hint": null, "migration_anchor": null}
+      ],
+      "flagged": [
+        {"kind": "flag_removed" | "flag_numbered" | "flag_private" | "flag_attribute",
+         "path": str, "line": int, "column": int, "before": str,
+         "after": null, "hint": str | null, "migration_anchor": str | null}
+      ]
+    }
+"""
+
+
 def _format_json_report(report: Report) -> str:
-    """JSON report for programmatic consumption (CI, editors)."""
+    """JSON report for programmatic consumption (CI, editors).
+
+    Versioned via :data:`REPORT_SCHEMA_VERSION` — parsers should check
+    the top-level ``schema_version`` key before reading the rest.
+    """
     payload = {
+        "schema_version": REPORT_SCHEMA_VERSION,
         "scanned_files": report.scanned_files,
         "rewritten_files": report.rewritten_files,
         "applied": [asdict(f) for f in report.applied],
@@ -407,6 +442,46 @@ def _format_json_report(report: Report) -> str:
     return json.dumps(payload, indent=2)
 
 
+def _is_dirty_tree(path: Path) -> bool:
+    """True when ``path`` is inside a git repo with uncommitted changes.
+
+    Uses ``git status --porcelain`` for speed and stability. Returns
+    ``False`` when git isn't installed, the path isn't in a repo, or
+    the repo is clean — any non-clean state returns ``True`` so the
+    ``--apply`` guard fails safe.
+
+    The check is best-effort: absence of git isn't a reason to block
+    the rewrite (sellers may run in sandboxed or read-only environments
+    where git isn't available). A ``True`` result means we saw
+    definite uncommitted state.
+    """
+    import shutil
+    import subprocess
+
+    if shutil.which("git") is None:
+        return False
+
+    target = path.resolve()
+    cwd = target if target.is_dir() else target.parent
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "status", "--porcelain"],
+            cwd=cwd,
+            check=False,
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        return False
+    # Exit 128 = not a git repo; anything non-zero → treat as clean
+    # (not blocking — we don't want `--apply` in a sandboxed env to
+    # break because git can't run).
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        return False
+    return bool(result.stdout.strip())
+
+
 def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     """CLI entry point for ``python -m adcp.migrate v3-to-v4``."""
     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
@@ -429,6 +504,18 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
             "Commit your tree first so `git diff` is your review view."
         ),
     )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--allow-dirty",
+        action="store_true",
+        help=(
+            "Allow --apply even when the git working tree has "
+            "uncommitted changes. Default is to refuse so `git diff` "
+            "after the migration shows only the codemod's rewrites, "
+            "not a mix of the seller's in-progress work and the "
+            "codemod. Pass --allow-dirty when you know what you're "
+            "doing (e.g. applying to a staged change deliberately)."
+        ),
+    )
     parser.add_argument(
         "--json",
         action="store_true",
@@ -440,6 +527,17 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
         print(f"error: path does not exist: {args.path}", file=sys.stderr)
         return 2
 
+    if args.apply and not args.allow_dirty and _is_dirty_tree(args.path):
+        print(
+            "error: --apply refused on a dirty git working tree.\n"
+            "       Commit your changes first so `git diff` after the\n"
+            "       migration shows only the codemod's rewrites. Pass\n"
+            "       --allow-dirty to override (e.g. you're deliberately\n"
+            "       applying on top of staged changes).",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+        return 2
+
     report = run(args.path, apply_changes=args.apply)
 
     if args.json:

src/adcp/server/__init__.py

@@ -55,11 +55,14 @@ async def get_products(params, context=None):
 from adcp.capabilities import validate_capabilities
 from adcp.server.a2a_server import ADCPAgentExecutor, MessageParser, create_a2a_server
 from adcp.server.auth import (
+    AsyncTokenValidator,
     BearerTokenAuthMiddleware,
     Principal,
+    SyncTokenValidator,
     TokenValidator,
     auth_context_factory,
     constant_time_token_match,
+    validator_from_token_map,
 )
 from adcp.server.base import (
     AccountAwareToolContext,
@@ -172,11 +175,14 @@ async def get_products(params, context=None):
     "SkillMiddleware",
     "create_a2a_server",
     # Bearer-token auth middleware (seller-facing recipe)
+    "AsyncTokenValidator",
     "BearerTokenAuthMiddleware",
     "Principal",
+    "SyncTokenValidator",
     "TokenValidator",
     "auth_context_factory",
     "constant_time_token_match",
+    "validator_from_token_map",
     # Idempotency middleware (AdCP #2315 seller side)
     "IdempotencyStore",
     "MemoryBackend",

src/adcp/server/auth.py

@@ -72,10 +72,12 @@ async def validate_token(token: str) -> Principal | None:
 import inspect
 import json
 import logging
-from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
+from collections.abc import Awaitable, Mapping
 from contextvars import ContextVar
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Protocol, TypeVar
+
+_V = TypeVar("_V")
 
 from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
 from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
@@ -138,16 +140,32 @@ class Principal:
     metadata: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
 
 
-TokenValidator = Callable[[str], "Principal | None | Awaitable[Principal | None]"]
+class SyncTokenValidator(Protocol):
+    """Synchronous token validator — ``def validate_token(token) -> Principal | None``."""
+
+    def __call__(self, token: str) -> Principal | None: ...
+
+
+class AsyncTokenValidator(Protocol):
+    """Asynchronous token validator —
+    ``async def validate_token(token) -> Principal | None``."""
+
+    def __call__(self, token: str) -> Awaitable[Principal | None]: ...
+
+
+TokenValidator = SyncTokenValidator | AsyncTokenValidator
 """Seller-supplied callable that validates a bearer token.
 
 Called with the raw token string (``Authorization: Bearer <token>``
 with the prefix already stripped). Return a :class:`Principal` on
-success, ``None`` to reject.
+success, ``None`` to reject. Sync and async callables are both
+accepted — the middleware awaits the result when it's awaitable.
 
-Sync and async callables are both accepted — the middleware awaits the
-result when it's awaitable, so plain ``def validate_token(...)`` and
-``async def validate_token(...)`` both work.
+Declared as a union of two Protocols (rather than a
+``Callable[[str], Principal | None | Awaitable[...]]`` alias)
+because mypy narrows Protocol unions per-call-site: downstream code
+using ``async def validate_token`` gets the async branch without
+``type: ignore`` noise. Either protocol is a valid ``TokenValidator``.
 
 **Do not raise on invalid tokens.** Exceptions become ``500 Internal
 Server Error`` responses, which leak the presence of an auth path
@@ -367,7 +385,7 @@ def auth_context_factory(meta: RequestMetadata) -> ToolContext:
 # ------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
-def constant_time_token_match(token: str, stored_hashes: dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
+def constant_time_token_match(token: str, stored_hashes: Mapping[str, _V]) -> _V | None:
     """Look up a token in a dict of SHA-256 hashes using
     :func:`hmac.compare_digest` rather than dict-containment.
 
@@ -393,3 +411,42 @@ def constant_time_token_match(token: str, stored_hashes: dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
         if hmac.compare_digest(candidate, stored_hash):
             return value
     return None
+
+
+def validator_from_token_map(
+    token_map: Mapping[str, Principal],
+) -> SyncTokenValidator:
+    """Build a :data:`TokenValidator` from a ``{raw_token: Principal}`` map.
+
+    The shape most demo/test agents actually need — a fixed set of
+    tokens mapped to principals — without having to write the
+    constant-time plumbing. The returned validator hashes each raw
+    token at construction time and does constant-time lookups via
+    :func:`hmac.compare_digest` on every call, matching the security
+    properties of a hand-rolled validator::
+
+        validate_token = validator_from_token_map({
+            "token-acme": Principal(caller_identity="p-acme", tenant_id="acme"),
+            "token-globex": Principal(caller_identity="p-globex", tenant_id="globex"),
+        })
+        app.add_middleware(BearerTokenAuthMiddleware, validate_token=validate_token)
+
+    Production agents looking tokens up in Postgres / Redis / Vault
+    should write their own async validator instead — this helper is
+    for the small-fixed-set case (demo, test, CI fixtures).
+
+    :param token_map: Mapping of raw bearer tokens to their resolved
+        :class:`Principal`. Tokens are hashed at construction; the
+        plaintext is not retained.
+    :returns: A :data:`SyncTokenValidator` (which satisfies
+        :data:`TokenValidator`).
+    """
+    stored_hashes: dict[str, Principal] = {
+        hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest(): principal
+        for token, principal in token_map.items()
+    }
+
+    def _validate(token: str) -> Principal | None:
+        return constant_time_token_match(token, stored_hashes)
+
+    return _validate